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Introduction
The recent fi nancial crisis has shown that 
liquidity risk plays an important role in 
the contemporary fi nancial system. This 
is especially true for economies that are 
traditionally based on banks and credit markets. 
A liquidity shock may propagate through 
a real channel or an information channel and 
then affect the entire fi nancial system (Frait 
& Komárková, 2011). As a systemic banking 
crisis can have costly consequences such as 
declines in gross domestic product growth, 
real house prices and real equity prices and 
increases in unemployment rate, real public 
debt, among other effects (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009), it is not surprising that most regulators, 
policymakers and academics devote signifi cant 
attention to various aspects of liquidity risk 
measurement and management. National 
regulators monitor the level of bank liquidity 
in individual banking sectors. New legislative 
rules concerning bank liquidity were issued in 
December 2010. One component of the Basel 
III rules strengthens liquidity risk regulation by 
imposing minimum liquidity standards (Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio) 
and implementing monitoring tools to assess 
liquidity risk (BIS, 2010).
There are also numerous empirical studies 
focusing on the risk of contagion through the 
interbank market (e.g., Allen & Gale, 2000; 
Blavarg & Nimander, 2002; Memmel & Sachs, 
2013; or Wells, 2004), on the determinants 
of bank liquidity risk (such as Aspachs et al., 
2005; Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008; Dinger, 
2009; Lucchetta, 2007; Moore, 2010; or Rauch 
et al., 2010) or on the sensitivity of banks to 
various liquidity shocks (e.g., Boss et al., 2007; 
Komárková et al., 2011; Negrila, 2010; or Van 
den End, 2008). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no empirical study focusing 
on the determinants of bank vulnerability to 
a bank run. This paper therefore attempts to fi ll 
this gap.
There are several reasons that we focus 
on the Visegrad countries (Czechia, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia). First, the national 
fi nancial systems can be characterized as 
bank-oriented and concentrated on a model 
of universal banking. Banks have a dominant 
role in fi nancial intermediation and banks are 
also important for the whole economies of 
these countries. One can illustrate this on the 
indicator of total banking assets over GDP. The 
values from 2015 show 127% in Czechia, 113% 
in Hungary, 85% in Poland and Slovakia.
Second, banking sectors in the Visegrad 
(hereafter V4) countries are dominated by 
foreign banks and fi nancial conglomerates that 
are often present and systematically important 
in many countries. Therefore, fi nancial stability 
of these banking sectors and their ability to 
withstand sudden deposit withdrawal can be 
affected also by strategies implemented by 
multinational fi nancial conglomerates and by 
the fi nancial stability and credibility of both the 
parent company and its subsidiaries.
Third, due to aforementioned characteristics 
the banking sectors in the V4 countries are 
suffi ciently homogeneous for application of 
identical methodology and variables. On the 
other hand, they slightly differ in structure and 
macroeconomic conditions. Hence, we meet 
the requirements for an insightful cross-country 
comparison and can expect some differences in 
explaining vulnerability of banks to a potential 
bank run.
Fourth, we are convinced that the risk 
of bank run in the V4 countries is not only 
theoretical and imaginary eventuality but 
deserves a serious research interest. Our 
view is also supported by recent evidence. 
Besides the well-known examples of bank runs 
in developed countries such as Northern Rock 
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in the UK, IndyMac and Wachowia in the US 
or DSB Bank in the Netherlands bank runs 
occurred also in central and Eastern Europe. 
The most recent episodes can be found in 
Bulgaria (Corporate Commercial Bank and First 
Investment Bank in June 2014) and in Poland 
(SK Bank in December 2015).
Therefore, the aim of the paper is to 
examine potential bank runs in the V4 countries. 
In particular, we determine maximum volume 
of deposits that can be withdrawn from each 
individual bank and identify the determinants of 
banks’ sensitivity to a bank run. The paper is 
structured as follows. The next section provides 
theoretical background on bank liquidity and 
bank runs. Then, we focus on the methodology, 
data and results of the analysis. The fi nal 
section offers concluding remarks.
1. Bank Liquidity and Bank Runs
Each bank has to be liquid, which means that 
it should have suffi cient fi nancial resources 
to meet its obligations as they fall due or be 
able to obtain such funds at reasonable costs. 
Insuffi cient bank liquidity may lead to a situation 
in which the majority of depositors intend to 
withdraw their funds, which will in turn result in 
a run on the bank.
Banks have been always plagued by the 
problem of bank runs. Freixas and Rochet 
(1997) defi ne a bank run as a situation wherein 
depositors observe large withdrawals from 
their bank, fear bankruptcy and respond by 
withdrawing their own deposits. Banks are 
vulnerable to runs, which can lead to closure 
and liquidation because they issue liquid 
liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but 
invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans. 
A banking panic then occurs when depositors at 
many or all of the banks in a region or a country 
attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously 
(Allen & Gale, 1998).
The theoretical literature on bank runs is 
primarily based on the study of Bryant (1980) 
and the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
that accentuate the fact that bank runs are self-
fulfi lling prophecies. Two types of bank runs can 
be distinguished: effi cient and ineffi cient. Given 
the assumption that the liquidation of some 
assets is costly, there are multiple equilibriums. 
If depositors believe that a banking panic will 
occur, it is optimal for each depositor to attempt 
to withdraw his funds. The bank will then have 
to liquidate some of its assets at a loss. Those 
depositors who withdraw initially will receive 
more than those who wait (given the assumption 
of fi rst-come, fi rst-served). Anticipating this, 
all depositors have an incentive to withdraw 
immediately. Such a situation may be called 
an ineffi cient bank run. Conversely, all agents 
withdraw their funds according to their 
consumption needs if no depositors believe 
that a panic will occur (and another equilibrium 
exists).
An effi cient bank run is based on 
fundamental factors. Depositors who have 
information concerning an impending downturn 
in the business cycle may anticipate fi nancial 
diffi culties in the banking sector and attempt 
to withdraw their funds. Such behavior will 
precipitate the crisis (Allen & Gale, 1998).
As bank runs are typically considered costly 
and adverse events for the banking sector and 
the whole economy, most economists and, 
particularly, regulators attempt to determine the 
best ways to prevent bank runs. One possibility 
is to establish a functional deposit insurance 
scheme. A major argument in favor of deposit 
insurance is that it maintains and promotes 
fi nancial stability by preventing ineffi cient bank 
runs arising from asymmetric information and 
self-fulfi lling prophecies (as in Diamond & 
Dybvig, 1983). On the other hand, many studies 
indicate that deposit insurance fails to maintain 
banking stability because of moral hazard.
To a certain extent, effi cient liquidity risk 
management can also prevent bank runs. 
A suffi cient level of bank liquidity in the form 
of liquidity buffers can prevent panic sales of 
assets when banks face pressure caused by 
their need to cover investors’ request to withdraw 
deposits or by investors’ unwillingness to roll 
over short-term bonds issued by banks. Such 
buffers enhance the ability of banks to absorb 
external shocks (Frait & Komárková, 2011). 
Fund-raising options also include strategies 
involving the interbank market (where banks 
can borrow from other banks in response to 
liquidity demand) and the option of relying on 
emergency liquidity assistance from a lender of 
last resort (Aspachs et al., 2005).
Therefore, in accordance with the 
recommendation of the Basel Committee for 
Banking Supervision, fi nancial institutions 
should gauge their potential vulnerability to 
such events by conducting of stress tests (BIS, 
2000). Such stress testing would enable us to 
determine the worst-case scenario for each 
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bank in the banking sectors of the V4 countries 
and to investigate which factors affect the 
sensitivity of individual banks to a bank run.
2. Methodology and Data
First, we will evaluate the level of liquidity 
risk for each bank in the sample using the 
most commonly employed liquidity ratio, the 
liquid asset ratio. The liquid asset ratio (LAR) 
is the share of liquid assets in total assets 
(Equation 1).
 %100*
assetstotal
assetsliquidLAR 
 
(1)
This ratio should give us information on 
a bank’s capacity to absorb a general liquidity 
shock. As a general rule, the higher the ratio, 
the higher the capacity to absorb liquidity shock 
is, provided that market liquidity is the same for 
all banks in the sample. We use the BankScope 
measure of liquid assets which includes cash, 
government bonds, short-term claims on other 
banks (including certifi cates of deposit), and 
where appropriate the trading portfolio.
As a next step, we will simulate a run on 
a bank by the withdrawal of a certain volume of 
clients’ deposits. There are studies that focus on 
modeling bank runs in the Czech (Komárková 
et al., 2011), Slovak (Jurča & Rychtárik, 2006), 
Romanian (Negrila, 2010), Austrian (Boss et al., 
2004 and 2007) and Luxembourg (Rychtárik, 
2009) banking sectors. These studies modeled 
potential bank runs in slightly different ways. 
Komárková et al. (2011) simulated deposit 
withdrawals of an average of 11% of total 
deposits. Negrila (2010) tested the impact of the 
sudden withdrawal of 20% of individual deposits 
and 10% of corporate deposits. Boss et al. 
(2004) stressed liquidity ratios via a scenario in 
which nonbank customers would withdraw 20% 
of their deposits; they continued their analysis 
by testing the impact of a withdrawal of 50% of 
nonbank deposits (Boss et al., 2007). Jurča and 
Rychtárik (2006) considered a 20% decline in 
client deposits. Rychtárik (2009) measured the 
sensitivity of banks to the withdrawal of 20% of 
client deposits.
Based on the above cited studies, we will 
simulate the bank run by a 20% withdrawal 
of deposits; this haircut will be applied to total 
deposits without accounting for the agreed 
maturities of different types of deposits. This 
simulation is in accordance with time structure 
of deposits in the V4 countries at the beginning 
of 2015. According to national central banks’ 
statistics the sight deposits accounted for 69.6% 
of all deposits in Czechia, 49.2% in Hungary, 
44.7% in Poland and 51.4% in Slovakia. Our 
model of the bank run also conforms to the 
course of the aforementioned bank runs in 
Bulgaria and Poland.
To calculate the stressed value of the liquid 
asset ratio, we have to deduct the volume 
of withdrawn deposits, i.e., 20% of clients’ 
deposits, from liquid assets. Banks must use 
liquid assets to repay deposits. Moreover, the 
volume of total assets also declines as a result 
of this operation. Equation 2 captures these 
modifi cations.
 %100*
deposits*2.0assetstotal
deposits*2.0assetsliquidLARS 

 
(2)
Next, we will compare this stress value of the 
liquid asset ratio (LARS) to the baseline value 
of this ratio (LARB, i.e., LAR). The percentage 
change of the ratio LAR between its stress and 
baseline values will be calculated according 
to Equation 3. The results will reveal the 
magnitude of the relative changes between the 
stress and baseline values, which will enable us 
to determine which bank is the most vulnerable. 
Since the values of LARS are obviously always 
less than the values of LARB, we will quantify 
the extent of the percentage change in positive 
numbers. We will also be able to determine 
the worst-case scenario for each bank in the 
sample, i.e. the maximum volume of deposits 
that can be withdrawn from the bank.
 %100*
LAR
LARLARLAR
B
BS 
 
(3)
Finally, to identify determinants that affect 
the worst-case scenario for banks in the V4 
countries, we will use panel data regression 
analysis (Equation 4).
 (4)
where ΔDit is the maximum possible deposit 
withdrawal for bank i at time t (expressed as 
a percentage of deposits of bank i at time t), Xit is 
vector of explanatory variables for bank i at time 
t, α is a constant, β’ is a row vector of coeffi cient 
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that represents the slope of explanatory 
variables, δi represents fi xed effects for bank i, 
and εi is the error term. The maximum deposit 
withdrawal refers to the situation in which the 
stressed value of LAR is equal to zero i.e. 
LARS = 0. This is related to the situation when 
the numerator of Equation 2 is equal to zero, i.e. 
when the maximum deposit withdrawal is equal 
to the available liquid assets of the bank. The 
panel regression is applied in order to involve 
the whole national banking sector into one 
model. Although we work with bank-level data 
the banks perform under common regulation 
and supervision framework and face the same 
macroeconomic conditions.
It is evident that the most crucial task 
is to determine the appropriate explanatory 
variables. Although the liquidity problems of 
certain banks during the global fi nancial crisis 
re-emphasized that liquidity is very important 
for the functioning of fi nancial markets and the 
banking sector, an important gap nevertheless 
exists in the empirical literature on liquidity and 
its measurement. This is especially true for the 
determinants of bank sensitivity to any stress 
scenario; to the best of our knowledge, there is 
no empirical study focusing on the determinants 
of bank vulnerability to a bank run. Therefore, in 
our literature review, we will focus on empirical 
studies that sought to identify the determinants 
of selected liquidity ratio. Studies have reported 
that some determinants have positive effects in 
some countries but negative effects in others. 
In essence, the potential determinants of 
bank liquidity can be divided into two groups: 
macroeconomic and bank-specifi c variables.
Many studies have tested the impact of 
gross domestic product (GDP) on bank liquidity. 
This impact may be either positive (such as 
in Fielding & Shortland, 2005; Vodová 2013; 
2015), which signals that a cyclical downturn 
should reduce banks’ expected transaction 
demand for money and therefore lead to 
decreased liquidity, or negative, which means 
that banks hold a smaller amount of liquidity 
in periods of stronger economic growth (as 
demonstrated by Aspachs et al., 2005; Dinger 
2009; Grant, 2012; Moore, 2010; Rauch et al., 
2010; Vodová, 2013).
Another macroeconomic variable, the 
unemployment rate, is connected with the 
demand for loans and typically acts as a proxy 
for the general health of the economy. However, 
its impact on bank liquidity is again mixed – 
positive according to Munteanu (2012) and 
Vodová (2013) and negative as in Munteanu 
(2012); Rauch et al. (2010); Vodová (2013; 
2015). The negative impact of unemployment 
has more of economic rationality as it is in 
accordance with the fact that banks suffer 
from a reduction in solvency and create lower 
liquidity in troubled economic times. The 
positive impact can be particularly revealed in 
times of economic stability and relatively stable 
unemployment rate.
The levels of various types of interest rates 
also appear to be important: the monetary 
policy interest rate, money market interest rate, 
interbank interest rate and lending interest rate. 
Again, in some countries, the effect of the interest 
rate on bank liquidity is positive (e.g., Agénor et 
al., 2000; Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008; Dinger, 
2009; Fielding & Shortland, 2005; Lucchetta, 
2007; Moore, 2010; Munteanu, 2012; Vodová, 
2013; 2015), while in other countries or periods, 
the interest rate adversely affects bank liquidity 
(see Aspachs et al., 2005; Bunda & Desquilbet, 
2008; Grant, 2012; Lucchetta, 2007; Moore, 
2010; Munteanu, 2012; Rauch et al., 2010; 
or Vodová, 2013 and 2015). The same, e.g., 
mixed results, can also be observed for the 
interest margin – a negative impact in Aspachs 
et al. (2005) or Grant (2012); while a positive 
link is reported by Vodová (2015). A positive 
relationship between interest rates and bank 
liquidity is connected with the problem of credit 
rationing, while a negative link indicates that 
if lending activity is more profi table, banks will 
hold a smaller buffer of liquid assets and prefer 
to provide loans. 
Recent studies have also focused on the 
impact of the fi nancial crisis on bank liquidity, 
which may be again either negative (such as 
in Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008; Moore, 2010; 
Vodová, 2013 and 2015) or positive (as it was 
demonstrated by Berrospide, 2013; Cornet 
et al., 2012; Moore, 2010). The negative link 
between the fi nancial crisis and bank liquidity 
is obvious: a fi nancial crisis can be the result 
of poor bank liquidity; poor bank liquidity can 
also be a result of a fi nancial crisis. However, 
a positive relationship between the crisis and 
bank liquidity can also be explained: during 
the crisis, banks devoted greater attention to 
cautious liquidity risk management and held 
higher buffers of liquid assets. Thus, during 
a crisis, bank liquidity may even increase. 
Such behavior may also be associated with 
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liquidity hoarding (Acharya & Merrouche, 2013; 
Berrospide, 2013; Kapadia et al., 2012).
Among other macroeconomic factors, the 
type of exchange rate regime is an important 
consideration. According to Bunda and 
Desquilbet (2008), in extreme regimes such as 
pure fl oating and currency board and dollarized 
economies, banks are more liquid than in 
intermediate regimes. Additional relevant 
factors are the share of public expenditures 
in GDP (which Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008, 
demonstrated to have a positive effect on bank 
liquidity); the volatility of the cash to deposit 
ratio (where higher volatility increases bank 
liquidity according to Agénor et al., 2000); 
and the probability of obtaining support from 
a lender of last resort in the event of a liquidity 
shortage (which reduces incentives to hold 
liquid assets as demonstrated by Aspachs et 
al., 2005). Fielding and Shortland (2005) also 
demonstrated that banks hold excessive liquid 
reserves in periods of political instability.
Although banks within a given country face 
to the same macroeconomic conditions, their 
liquidity levels differ. The reason lies in different 
bank-specifi c conditions. Many bank-specifi c 
variables such as the size of the bank, its capital 
adequacy and profi tability, and the quality of its 
loan portfolio, have been analyzed in individual 
studies.
Two different theories explain the link 
between capital adequacy and bank liquidity 
(Berger & Bouwman, 2009). The fi nancial 
fragility-crowding-out hypothesis suggests that 
bank capital may impede liquidity creation by 
making the bank’s capital structure less fragile. 
A fragile capital structure encourages the bank 
to commit to monitoring its borrowers, and, 
hence, allows it to extend loans. Additional 
equity capital makes it more diffi cult for less 
fragile banks to commit to monitoring, which 
in turn hampers the bank’s ability to create 
liquidity. Capital may also reduce liquidity 
creation because it crowds out deposits. This 
negative relationship between bank liquidity 
and capital adequacy has been reported by 
Berger and Bouwman (2009), Diamond and 
Rajan (2001), Dinger (2009), Distinguin et al. 
(2013), Gorton and Winton (2000), Lei and 
Song (2013), Munteanu (2012), and Vodová 
(2013 and 2015). An alternative view – the risk 
absorption hypothesis – is related to banks’ 
role as risk transformers and emphasizes that 
higher capital improves banks’ ability to absorb 
risk and hence their ability to create liquidity. 
This theory has been confi rmed by Berger 
and Bouwman (2009), Berrospide (2013), and 
Vodová (2013; 2015).
Banks that are net lenders on the interbank 
market tend to be smaller than borrower banks 
(Lucchetta, 2007). Most studies agree that the 
size of banks is negatively correlated with their 
liquidity. Large banks are less willing to hold 
liquid assets because they rely more on funds 
from the interbank market (Berrospide, 2013; 
Cornet et al., 2012; Dinger, 2009; Vodová, 
2013).
The quality of a bank’s credit portfolio is also 
relevant: with a higher share of nonperforming 
loans, banks begin to offset higher credit risk 
with more cautious liquidity risk management 
(Vodová, 2013; 2015). Moreover, greater 
portion of nonperforming loans in portfolio has 
a negative impact on bank’s profi tability. The 
link between bank profi tability and liquidity may, 
again, be either negative (such as in Grant, 
2012 or Vodová, 2013) or positive (Vodová, 
2013). Bank profi tability having a negative 
infl uence on liquidity is consistent the standard 
fi nance theory, which emphasizes the negative 
correlation between liquidity and profi tability. 
Bank profi tability may be indicative of strategy 
whereby liquidity-constrained banks need to 
accumulate profi ts that can then be invested 
in liquid assets and thus used as a source of 
liquidity.
The selection of explanatory variables 
is based on the studies cited above. We 
considered whether the use of a particular 
variable is economically reasonable in case of 
the V4 countries. We also considered which 
other factors could infl uence the sensitivity of 
banks to a bank run.
We can expect that the most vulnerable 
banks should be those with an insuffi cient 
amount of client deposits to fi nance their 
activities. Therefore, they need to use other 
sources of funding. This assumption is refl ected 
in application of the loan-to-deposit and net-
interbank-position ratios. LODE measures the 
structural mismatch between borrowing and 
lending to/from customers. Banks that show 
large funding gap (very high LODE) are more 
exposed to liquidity risk. Vulnerable banks 
should also focus more on providing loans to 
non-bank customers; therefore, they have 
a smaller buffer of liquid assets. Bank liquidity 
and profi tability are closely linked. If banks 
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seek only to achieve maximum profi tability, 
they provide relatively more loans to non-
bank customers and use more funds from the 
interbank market to fi nance their activities, 
which makes them considerably more 
vulnerable in the event of a crisis (which can be 
accompanied by, e.g., a bank run). Conversely, 
the safest strategy is to hold a suffi cient buffer 
of liquid assets (i.e., to have high value for 
the LAR ratio), to provide loans to non-bank 
customers on a rational basis and to fi nance 
lending activity mainly from client deposits. 
These ideas, together with the fi ndings of 
studies focusing on the determinants of liquidity 
ratios, are refl ected in the list of variables 
employed in this study (Tab. 1).
We considered seven bank-specifi c factors 
and seven macroeconomic factors. We do not 
have exact expectations concerning the impact 
of these factors on a bank’s sensitivity to a bank 
run, as this is the fi rst study to investigate 
this problem. The macroeconomic data were 
provided by the International Financial Statistics 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
European Central Bank (ECB), Czech National 
Bank (CNB), National Bank of Poland (NBP), 
Hungarian National Bank (MNB) and National 
Bank of Slovakia (NBS). The bank specifi c data 
were obtained from the unconsolidated balance 
sheet and profi t and loss data recorded in the 
BankScope database.
We used data over the period 2000-2014. 
Tab. 2 provides additional details on the sample. 
Despite the relatively small number of banks in 
the sample, the data set includes signifi cant 
parts of all banking sectors (usually more than 
70% of total assets of the banking sector). 
Due to the homogeneity of the data set, we 
include only data from commercial banks. We 
exclude branches of foreign banks, mortgage 
banks, building societies and state banks with 
special purposes (such as Českomoravská 
záruční a rozvojová banka, Slovenská záručná 
a rozvojová banka, Česká exportní banka, 
Exim banka, Magyar Fejlesztési Bank or Bank 
Gospodarstwa Krajowego). The national panels 
Bank-specifi c variables Source
CAP: share of equity in total assets of the bank BankScope
NPL: share of non-performing loans in total volume of loans BankScope
ROA: share of net profi t in total assets of the bank BankScope
TOA: logarithm of total assets of the bank BankScope
NITA: share of net interbank position in total assets of the bank BankScope
LODE: share of loans in deposits of the bank BankScope
LOTA: share of loans in total assets of the bank BankScope
Macroeconomic and sectoral variables
GDP: growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP volume % change) IMF
INF: infl ation rate (CPI % change) IMF
IRB: interest rate on interbank transactions IMF
IRL: interest rate on loans CNB, MNB, NBP, NBS
IRM: difference between interest rates on loans and deposits CNB, MNB, NBP, NBS
MIR: monetary policy interest rate CNB, MNB, NBP, ECB
UNE: unemployment rate IMF
Source: Authors’ compilation
Tab. 1: Variables Defi nition
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are unbalanced because some banks do not 
report or exist over the full period of analysis.
3. Results and Discussion
The fi rst part of this section presents the 
median values of the baseline and the stress 
values of the liquid asset ratio and the worst-
case scenario (bank run) for each bank in the 
sample. The second part of this section focuses 
on factors that determine vulnerability of banks 
to the bank run.
3.1 Scenario Analysis
The median values of the baseline and stress 
values of the share of liquid assets in total assets 
(LAR) are presented in Fig. 1. As a higher value 
of this ratio means higher liquidity, it is evident 
that bank liquidity in all V4 countries decrease 
during the analyzed period. However, the trends 
differ between countries. The liquidity of Czech 
banks declined during the period 2000-2007, 
due to the mutual effect of higher lending activity 
by Czech banks and the decrease of balances 
with central banks and other banks (CNB, 
2008). After a slight improvement in liquidity 
during 2008-2011, liquidity subsequently 
decreased in recent years. As the largest share 
of liquid assets in the Czech banking sector 
consists of government securities, it is evident 
that the development of liquid assets as a whole 
is strongly infl uenced by their volume held by 
banks (CNB, 2012; 2014).
When it comes to the Hungarian banking 
sector, it was affected by the fi nancial crisis 
already in 2007. According to HFSA (2009), the 
internal, structural features of the banking sector 
have evolved over the years. These specifi cs 
area very high loan-to-deposit ratio, long net 
foreign currency position which resulted from the 
growing ratio of foreign currency loans (about 
one third of loans to non-fi nancial companies 
and even two thirds of loans to households). 
Moreover, some Hungarian banks provided 
loans to foreign customers especially from CEE 
countries which were fi nanced partly by local 
retail deposits. These structural weaknesses 
gained special importance due to the worsening 
fi nancial and economic conditions.
The situation was very similar in the Polish 
banking sector. The liquid asset ratio fl uctuated 
Indicator
Values for Individual Years
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
Czechia
Total no. of banks 40 38 37 35 35 36 37 37 37 39 41 44 43 44 45
No. of obs. banks 15 15 16 16 16 16 13 13 12 12 13 13 14 14 14
Share of asset (%) 59 68 74 74 74 72 75 75 66 68 68 75 69 72 74
Hungary
Total no. of banks 40 41 39 38 35 34 37 38 36 35 35 35 35 37 39
No. of obs. banks 14 18 23 24 26 28 28 27 25 24 21 19 20 19 14
Share of asset (%) 72 74 84 86 88 88 88 87 88 88 87 87 86 86 82
Poland
Total no. of banks 73 71 62 60 54 54 51 50 52 49 49 47 45 41 38
No. of obs. banks 22 23 26 26 28 28 26 27 30 35 35 35 35 33 38
Share of asset (%) 66 75 80 71 78 79 76 73 73 73 73 73 78 83 77
Slovakia
Total no. of banks 23 21 20 21 21 23 24 26 26 26 29 32 29 29 29
No. of obs. banks 9 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 11 11 9 9 9
Share of asset (%) 64 72 69 72 70 73 76 79 85 85 84 85 78 79 79
Source: Authors’ compilation based on statistics of national central banks
Tab. 2: Data Availability
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only slightly during the period 2000-2006. In 
2007, the liquidity started to decline. Banks 
fi nanced increased demand for loans both to 
households and non-fi nancial companies also 
by reduction of the part of liquid assets. Mainly 
small and medium sized banks with a poorly 
developed deposit base used funds from 
the interbank market (PFSA, 2008). In 2008, 
the increase in lending activities continued. 
However, important structural weaknesses 
occurred: the Polish banking sector as a whole 
became net borrower in the interbank market; 
household debts in foreign currency grew 
rapidly (up to more than 25% of total loan 
portfolio (PFSA, 2009)); and a very high loan-
to-deposit ratio.
The liquid asset ratio of Slovak banks 
fl uctuated only slightly during the period 2000-
2008; however, this ratio declined sharply in 
2009. The year 2009 is defi nitely a turning 
point for the banking sector: the economic 
crisis adversely effected sectors in which 
Slovak banks had signifi cant credit exposure. 
Moreover, activities in the interbank market 
changed dramatically. While Slovak banks had 
mostly received deposits from foreign banks 
and then conducted sterilization operations with 
the National Bank of Slovakia in previous years, 
after the euro changeover, these operations lost 
their former signifi cance. Most banks borrowed 
funds from other banks with the Eurosystem 
and predominantly invested these funds in 
government bonds and, in some cases, in 
the interbank market, mainly in transactions 
with parent banks (NBS, 2010). After a further 
decline in bank liquidity, we observe slight 
improvements in 2014.
A lower stressed value for the liquid asset 
is a clear signal of a liquidity outfl ow. Median 
values of the stressed liquid asset ratio for 
Czech banks are positive for the full period. 
This means that Czech banking sector as 
a whole should be well prepared for a bank 
run, simulated by a withdrawal of 20% of 
client deposits. Of course, individual banks in 
individual years could have problems coping 
with such a crisis; noteworthy in this regard 
are Equa bank in 2011-2014, Česká spořitelna 
Fig. 1: Baseline and Stressed Values of the Liquid Asset Ratio for Banks in the V4 Countries (in %)
Source: Authors’ calculations
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in 2006-2008 and 2014, ČSOB in 2006-2008 
and 2010, GE Money Bank in 2007-2009, 
J&T banka and Expobanka in 2012-2014, or 
Raiffeisenbank in 2010-2013.
Also Hungarian banking sector seems to be 
quite resilient which is refl ected in the positive 
median values of the stressed liquid asset ratio. 
Only a few banks would not be able to face such 
development, e.g. Budapest Bank, CIB Bank, 
Raiffeisen Bank, Sopron Bank Burgenland and 
Credigen bank.
However, in the case of Slovakia and 
Poland, the situation would be considerably 
worse. Median values of the stressed liquid 
asset ratio are positive only in the period 2000-
2008 for Slovakia and 2000-2009 for Poland. 
Beginning in 2009, Slovak banks on average 
would not be able to fi nance a 20% withdrawal 
of client deposits. During this second half of 
the analyzed period, only ČSOB and Komerční 
banka Bratislava in 2009-2011, Poštová banka 
and Citibank in 2009, Sberbank and Privatbanka 
in 2011 and UniCredit Bank in 2010 would have 
been able to cover 20% deposit withdrawals 
with using their liquid assets without necessity 
of converting less liquid assets to cash. During 
2009-2014, other banks would not have had 
suffi cient liquidity to fund the required deposit 
withdrawals.
Started in 2010, Polish banking sector as 
a whole would not be able to withstand the 
withdrawal of 20% of client deposits, with the 
exception of Raiffeisen Bank Polska, BPH Bank, 
Nordea Bank, Bank Polskiej Spoldzielczosci, 
SGB Bank and Mercedes-Benz Bank.
Regarding the average impact of a bank run 
on the liquid asset ratio, we observe a gradually 
rising negative effect of the simulated bank run 
on the liquidity of banks over the entire analyzed 
period (see Tab. 3 for average values). It is 
evident that the fi nancial crisis increased the 
sensitivity of all banks to a possible bank run. 
However, it is surprising that banks in three V4 
countries would have been the most vulnerable 
only recently. In particular, Czech banks in 2012 
and Slovak and Polish banks in 2013. It seems 
that with the exception of Hungary, there is 
a signifi cant time lag between the emergence 
of the fi nancial crisis and its impacts on liquidity 
of banks. We can also see that the impact of 
the crisis on banks differs among analyzed 
countries.
Our aim is also to determine the maximum 
volume of deposits that can be withdrawn from 
individual banks, i.e., to identify the worst-case 
scenario for each bank. The threshold volume of 
deposits was calculated under the assumption 
that the bank can use all of its liquid assets to 
Values for Individual Years
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
CZ 9 20 20 27 30 44 56 85 77 63 76 65 137 104 95
HU 40 51 32 41 37 33 34 39 65 89 81 52 70 80 43
PL 40 36 46 36 45 35 48 62 52 135 194 228 180 213 207
SK 33 44 36 59 47 36 37 38 38 105 137 160 202 294 192
Source: Authors’ calculations
Values for Individual Years
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
CZ 124 68 69 60 50 41 35 23 30 27 27 31 22 30 19
HU 23 33 27 34 35 24 25 26 49 38 42 29 43 37 30
PL 45 46 40 50 48 54 41 32 36 25 15 13 18 12 12
SK 44 37 41 31 36 44 42 43 44 19 15 12 9 7 11
Source: Authors’ calculations
Tab. 3: Average Decrease in the Liquid Asset Ratio in the V4 Countries (in %)
Tab. 4: Maximum Deposit Withdrawal in the V4 Countries (in %)
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meet depositors’ demands for cash. The data in 
Tab. 4 indicate the median values of maximum 
deposit withdrawal for banking sectors in the 
V4 countries. The fi gures on ability of individual 
banks to cover deposit withdrawals, i.e., the 
maximum deposit withdrawal (as a percentage 
of deposits) that the banks would be able 
to survive, can be obtained from authors 
upon request. The results are consistent with 
previous fi ndings: Czech and Hungarian banks 
are, on average, able to withstand larger 
deposit withdrawals than are Slovak and Polish 
banks. This conclusion has been evident since 
the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis.
Of course, there are again signifi cant 
differences among banks. There are banks 
that could only fi nance withdrawals of less 
than 10% of deposits in some years, such as 
Expobanka, Raiffeisenbank and UniCredit 
Bank in Czechia; ČSOB, OTP banka, Poštová 
banka, Privatbanka, Slovenská sporitelňa, 
Tatra banka and VÚB in Slovakia; CIB Bank, 
Budapest bank, MagNet Hungarian Civic Bank, 
Porsche bank and Sopron Bank Burgenland in 
Hungary and Alior Bank, Bank BGZ, BOS Bank, 
Credit Agricole Bank, DNB Bank, FM Bank, 
Getin Noble, Ideal Bank, ING Bank, Meritum 
Bank, Plus Bank, Bank Pocztowy, Santander 
Consumer Bank and Toyota bank in Poland. 
If customers sought to further withdraw their 
deposits, the existence of these banks would 
be in jeopardy because of insuffi cient liquidity. 
The depositors of Slovak Tatra banka or Polish 
Getin Noble would be able to withdraw only 1% 
of their deposits or even less in some years 
which is particularly alarming. Conversely, at 
least in some years, the depositors of certain 
other banks would be able to withdraw more 
than 50% of their deposits.
3.2 Panel Data Regression Analysis
To identify the factors that determine the 
sensitivity of banks to a bank run, we employ 
an econometric package EViews 9. After tests 
of stationarity, normality and multicollinearity, 
we proceed with regression estimation. We 
estimated Equation 4. First we included all 
explanatory variables that might have an effect 
on the dependent variable (all explanatory 
variables considered in the analysis are those 
which are presented in Tab. 1).
Some bank-specifi c variables as well as 
some macroeconomic factors could infl uence 
ability of banks to withstand sudden deposit 
withdrawal also with a certain time lag. For 
example, the deterioration in overall economic 
development probably does not increase bank 
vulnerability immediately, because the bank 
has suffi cient volume of liquid assets and its 
fi nancial situation is stable. More likely, the 
buffer of liquid assets is gradually decreasing 
due to worsening economic conditions. The 
bank which was initially liquid may gradually 
become illiquid. Likewise, the worsening quality 
of loan portfolio usually is manageable in short-
term. The vulnerability of bank increases if 
troubles with repaying the loans continues and 
escalates. The effect of profi tability can also be 
more pronounced with some delay as actual 
profi ts generated by illiquid assets will affect 
the future liquidity risk of the bank. Therefore, in 
economically rational cases we experimented 
with lagged variables in model estimations. The 
lags were used for the following variables CAP, 
NPL, ROA, GDP, UNE. The maximum time lag 
was set to two years for GDP growth rate and 
one year for remaining lagged variables. Similar 
approach to application of lagged variables can 
be found in e.g. Berrospide (2013), Vodová 
(2013) or Adusei (2015).
To reduce the number of explanatory 
variables, we used information criteria (Akaike, 
Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn). Our aim was 
to fi nd a regression model with a high value 
of the adjusted coeffi cient of determination in 
which all the variables involved are statistically 
signifi cant. The results for Czech banks are 
recorded in Tab. 5.
The explanatory power of the model is 
quite high. The sensitivity of Czech banks to 
the possible bank run, or, more preciously, 
the maximum deposit withdrawal for individual 
Czech banks, is determined primarily by two 
bank-specifi c and two macroeconomic factors.
Focusing on bank-specifi c factors, the 
bank’s profi tability and liquidity are important. 
The share of loans to deposits (LODE) is an 
indirect measure of bank liquidity. This ratio 
relates illiquid assets to liquid liabilities. The 
higher this ratio, the less liquid the bank is. The 
negative sign of the regression coeffi cient is 
consistent with the fact that the lower the value 
of the LODE ratio (and thus the higher the bank 
liquidity), the greater the deposit withdrawal the 
bank is able to withstand.
The positive link between bank profi tability 
measured by return on assets (ROA) and the 
ability of the bank to face a bank run may be 
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somewhat surprising. However, profi tability 
is one of the key factors of a bank’s fi nancial 
stability. This variable is lagged by two years, 
which means that banks that were fi nancially 
stable in the past are much safer even in the 
event of a sudden deposit withdrawal.
Among the macroeconomic factors, two 
variables are statistically signifi cant: the 
interest rate on loans (IRL) and unemployment 
rate (UNE). The interest rate on loans is 
likely connected with bank profi tability. With 
a higher interest rate on loans, a bank’s lending 
becomes more profi table. Furthermore, with 
higher accumulated profi t, the bank is better 
able to withstand the emergency of a crisis.
The unemployment rate is the last 
statistically signifi cant variable. Given an 
increase in the unemployment rate in the 
previous year, bank customers are able to 
withdraw a smaller portion of their deposits. 
This variable can act as a proxy for the general 
health of the economy. Therefore, with an 
increase in the unemployment rate (and 
given past deterioration of macroeconomic 
conditions) means that banks are more 
vulnerable to possible bank runs.
Determinants of the maximum deposit 
withdrawals for Hungarian banks are presented 
in Tab. 6. Four variables are statistically 
signifi cant: size of the bank, loan-to-deposit 
ratio, share of net interbank position in total 
assets and the unemployment rate. The 
explanatory power is slightly higher than for the 
Czech banking sector.
Two variables are the same as for Czech 
banks: loan-to-deposit ratio (LODE) and the 
unemployment rate (UNE). The share of net 
interbank position in total assets (NITA) refl ects 
the fact if the bank is a net lender or a net 
borrower on the interbank market. The positive 
sign of the regression coeffi cient signals that 
net lenders are safer in case of sudden deposit 
withdrawal. It is obvious as the net lenders 
operate with abundance of clients’ deposits and 
loans provided on the interbank market usually 
represent liquid assets.
Size of the bank (TOA) also matters in the 
Hungarian banking sector. Large banks are 
less vulnerable to a potential bank run than 
small banks. This fi nding is in accordance with 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) and stems from 
the fact that large banks in general have more 
established position on the interbank market 
and, therefore, better access to funds from this 
market. Moreover, large banks can use a wider 
range of sources of funding than small banks. 
For example, large banks are usually affi liated 
with a fi nancial conglomerate and, thus, intra-
group fund transfers are possible and available.
The ability of Polish banks to withstand 
the deposit withdrawal is determined mainly 
by their capital adequacy (CAP), position on 
the interbank market (NITA), the way how 
they fi nance their lending activity (LODE) and 
the general economic conditions (expressed 
e.g. by the rate of unemployment – UNE). The 
results are recorded in Tab. 7.
Two bank-specifi c variables (NITA and 
LODE) and one macroeconomic factor (UNE) 
have the same impact on the vulnerability of 
banks as it was explained above for Czech and 
Hungarian banks. The last statistically signifi cant 
Variable Coeffi cient Standard Deviation
Constant -1.8521* 0.3242
ROA (-1) 0.0346** 0.0097
LODE -0.0039* 0.0006
IRL 0.2147* 0.0459
UNE(-1) -0.1049* 0.0235
Adjusted R2 0.5591
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.8682
Total panel observations  172
Source: Authors’ calculations
Note: The starred coeffi cient estimates are signifi cant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Tab. 5: Factors Affecting the Sensitivity Banks to a Bank Run in Czechia
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variable is capital adequacy. Looking on previous 
research on liquidity of Polish banks, its negative 
infl uence is not a surprising fi nding. According 
to Vodová (2013), bank liquidity decreases with 
capital adequacy of the bank. This link between 
capital adequacy and bank liquidity shows that 
banks offset lower capital adequacy with more 
cautious liquidity risk management and hold 
suffi cient buffer of liquid assets. More liquid 
banks are able to repay the higher share of 
deposits to their depositors if needed.
The estimated coeffi cients that best fi t 
the regression model for Slovak banks are 
presented in Tab. 8. Two bank-specifi c and two 
macroeconomic factors are important for bank 
sensitivity to a bank run.
As in the case of Czech banks, profi tability 
and lending activity are also signifi cant for Slovak 
banks. However, regarding bank profi tability, 
the opposite relationship is observed. The 
negative infl uence of bank profi tability (ROA) is 
consistent with standard fi nance theory which 
emphasizes the negative correlation between 
liquidity and profi tability. It should be noted that 
ROA is lagged by one year in the model. This 
means that banks that earned less profi t in 
the previous year pay much more attention to 
liquidity risk management, which in turn refl ects 
in their greater capacity to withstand a possible 
bank run. Such banks are able to repay a higher 
percentage of their clients’ deposits.
Variable Coeffi cient Standard Deviation
Constant -638.99* 230.72
TOA 45.415** 21.069
LODE -9.15E-07*** 1.72E-06
NITA 0.0074* 0.0005
UNE -12.808** 7.5002
Adjusted R2 0.6371
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.7949
Total panel observations 328
Source: Authors’ calculations
Note: The starred coeffi cient estimates are signifi cant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Variable Coeffi cient Standard Deviation
Constant -33.791* 8.0196
CAP -1.9075* 0.4601
NITA 0.0083* 0.0003
LODE -0.0003* 3.78E-05
UNE(-1) -0.7407*** 0.4647
Adjusted R2 0.8774
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.9209
Total panel observations 351
Source: Authors’ calculations
Note: The starred coeffi cient estimates are signifi cant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Tab. 6: Factors Affecting the Sensitivity of Banks to a Bank Run in Hungary
Tab. 7: Factors Affecting the Sensitivity of Banks to a Bank Run in Poland
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It is not surprising that the second bank-
specifi c factor, again, accounts only for the 
liquidity of the bank. The share of loans in 
total assets (LOTA) indicates what percentage 
of the bank’s assets are tied up in illiquid 
loans; therefore, the higher this ratio, the less 
liquid the bank is. The sign of the estimated 
coeffi cient is negative, which is logical. Banks 
with a lower value of LOTA (i.e., banks with 
lower lending activity with non-bank clients) 
focus more on other types of banking business 
such as interbank loans or trading in securities. 
Both types of transactions increase the volume 
of liquid assets, which makes the bank less 
vulnerable to possible unforeseen deposit 
withdrawals.
Among the macroeconomic variables 
considered, the interest rate on interbank 
transactions (IRB) and the unemployment rate 
(UNE) are statistically signifi cant. The interbank 
interest rate can be perceived as the price of 
liquidity obtained on the interbank market. An 
increase in this price is a clear incentive to 
provide more interbank loans because a higher 
interbank interest rate makes these transactions 
more profi table. As interbank loans are a part 
of a bank’s liquid assets, the bank’s ability to 
withstand deposit withdrawal increases with 
larger volume of the disbursed interbank loans. 
This conclusion fully corresponds with the 
infl uence of the lending activity of a bank.
The impact of the unemployment rate on the 
ability of the bank to survive a bank run is the 
same as for all other V4 countries, only without 
any time lag. Under worsening macroeconomic 
conditions, banks are able to fi nance lower 
amounts of deposit withdrawals.
We can compare our results only with the 
fi ndings of Vodová (2013), who analyzed the 
determinants of the liquid asset ratio in the 
V4 countries for the period from 2000 to 2011. 
Regarding Czech, Hungarian and Polish banks, 
the determinants of the holding of liquid assets 
are completely different from the factors that 
infl uence the sensitivity of banks to a potential 
bank run. For Slovak banks, the holding of liquid 
assets increased as the interest rate on loans 
increased and decreased as profi tability, the 
unemployment rate and the capital adequacy 
of the bank increased. As we can see, two 
factors that infl uenced the level of bank liquidity 
measured by liquid asset ratio are also relevant 
to the sensitivity of banks to a possible bank 
run: bank profi tability and the unemployment 
rate. Two other factors are different. However, 
both of them have some connection with bank 
liquidity. This confi rms that the ability of banks 
to withstand an unforeseen deposit withdrawal 
is substantially determined by the level of bank 
liquidity. Banks that have a suffi cient buffer 
of liquid assets are safer than other banks, 
particularly during periods of fi nancial distress.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to determine 
maximum volume of deposits that can be 
withdrawn from banks in the V4 countries and 
identify the determinants of banks’ sensitivity to 
a bank run. The analysis was performed over 
the period 2000-2014.
Variable Coeffi cient Standard Deviation
Constant 1.0361* 0.1181
ROA (-1) -0.0229** 0.0097
LOTA -0.0084* 0.0017
IRB 0.0278* 0.0088
UNE -0.0248* 0.0049
Adjusted R2 0.6846
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.7886
Total panel observations 150
Source: Authors’ calculations
Note: The starred coeffi cient estimates are signifi cant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Tab. 8: Factors Affecting the Sensitivity of Banks to a Bank Run in Slovakia
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Bank liquidity, measured by the liquid asset 
ratio, decreased in all countries during the 
analyzed period. However, the rate of change of 
the LAR indicator differs across the V4 banking 
sectors. While the change in Hungary was only 
-10.5% (decrease of the median value from 33% 
in 2000 to 34% in 2014), the LAR in Slovakia 
dropped by 75% (decrease from 32% in 2000 
to just 8% in 2014). The change in liquidity of 
the Czech banks was -61% (decrease from 
41% in 2000 to 16% in 2014) and the change 
in Poland amounted to -65.4% (decrease 
from 26% to 9%). Moreover, we identifi ed two 
peculiar trends in the liquidity development. 
A distinct trend of the LAR deterioration can be 
observed between 2000 and 2009. Although 
some fl uctuations and reversals temporarily 
occurred the general trend was followed in 
all V4 countries. Especially in Hungary and 
Poland, some important structural weaknesses 
arose during that time. In particular, a very 
high loan-to-deposit ratio, a high share of 
foreign debts, and a negative net position in 
the interbank market. By contrast, substantially 
different development of the LAR indicator can 
be discovered during the post-crisis period. 
While the median value of LAR stagnated in 
Czechia and Poland, the trend of deterioration 
continued in Slovakia. The only banking sector 
that showed an increase of liquidity was in 
Hungary.
Stress values of the liquid asset ratio 
indicated that although Czech and Hungarian 
banks have, on average, been well prepared for 
a potential bank run, Slovak and Polish banks 
have not, on average, been able to withstand 
a 20% withdrawal of client deposits since 2009, 
respectively 2010. In all countries, the impact of 
this stress scenario increased during analyzed 
period. The ability of individual banks to survive 
an unforeseen deposit withdrawal differs 
signifi cantly. However, Czech and Hungarian 
banks are, on average, able to withstand larger 
deposit withdrawals than are Slovak and Polish 
banks. 
The results of the panel data regression 
analysis showed that the sensitivity of 
commercial banks from the V4 countries to 
a possible bank run, or more preciously, the 
maximum deposit withdrawal for individual 
banks, is determined primarily by bank liquidity 
(connected with lending activity, the way of 
its fi nancing and activity of the bank on the 
interbank market) and its profi tability (for Czech 
and Slovak banks) and capital adequacy 
(for Polish banks), the size of the bank (for 
Hungarian banks), the interest rate (on loans 
for Czech banks and on interbank transaction 
for Slovak banks), and the unemployment rate. 
Although the signs, magnitudes and lags are not 
perfectly consistent in all V4 countries we can 
conclude that the banks with suffi cient buffer of 
liquid assets operating with higher profi tability 
and capital adequacy in environment of higher 
interest rates and lower unemployment are able 
to withstand the largest unforeseen withdrawal 
and most successfully face a bank run. Such 
characteristics naturally proved to be even more 
important during periods of fi nancial distress.
There are many ways which may improve 
the research about determinants of banks’ 
sensitivity to a bank run in the future. First, we 
can simply extend the time series and divide 
the analysis into pre-crisis, crisis and post-
crisis periods. Another possibility is to extend 
the research into other banking sectors, e.g. 
to include other central and eastern European 
countries. It would be also possible to include 
other variables which may have effect on banks’ 
sensitivity to a bank run.
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Abstract
FACTORS AFFECTING SENSITIVITY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS TO BANK RUN 
IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES
Pavla Klepková Vodová, Daniel Stavárek
While managing liquidity, each bank should be prepared also for unexpected and exceptional 
events, such as bank runs. The aim of this paper is therefore to determine the maximum volume 
of deposits that can be withdrawn from individual banks operating in the Visegrad countries and to 
identify the determinants of their sensitivity to a bank run. The data cover the period from 2000 to 
2014. Although bank liquidity, measured by the liquid asset ratio, decreased in all countries during 
the analyzed period, the level of liquidity differs among countries. We have simulated a bank run as 
a sudden withdrawal of 20% of client deposits. The ability of individual banks to survive this crisis 
scenario signifi cantly differs. Nevertheless, as Czech and Hungarian banks were more liquid, they 
are better prepared for a potential bank run than Polish and Slovak banks. After that, using the 
panel data regression analysis, we tested seven bank-specifi c factors and seven macroeconomic 
factors. The sensitivity of commercial banks from the Visegrad countries to a possible bank run 
is determined mainly by different aspects of bank liquidity (not only the level of bank liquidity, but 
also connection to bank lending activity, the way of its fi nancing and also activity on the interbank 
market). Among the other bank specifi c factors, profi tability, capital adequacy and size of the 
banks are relevant in some countries. When it comes to macroeconomic factors, interest rate and 
unemployment rate are important. However, we can conclude that the most important factor is the 
level of bank liquidity: banks with a suffi cient buffer of liquid assets are safer than other banks, 
particular during periods of fi nancial distress.
Key Words: Bank run, liquid asset ratio, scenario analysis, panel data regression analysis.
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